The House of Representatives (DPR) soon plans to deliberate revisions to Law Number 34/2004 on the Indonesian Military (UU TNI). This move was taken after President Prabowo Subianto sent a presidential letter (Surpres) to the DPR giving the go ahead for the deliberations.
In the draft obtained by civil society organisations there are several crucial problems, especially related to the revival of the TNI's dwi-fungsi (dual socio-political role).
The Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform is of the view that based on the draft revisions to the TNI Law that they have obtained there are proposed changes that are problematic.
First, the proposal for expanding civilian positions that can be occupied by active TNI soldiers is a very controversial issue because this can obscure the boundaries between military and civilian domains. This can be seen in the proposed changes to Article 47 Paragraph (2) of the law that proposes the addition of the phrase "as well as other ministries/institutions that require active soldiers and expertise in accordance with presidential policy".
The addition of this phrase is very dangerous because it expands the scope of civilian positions that can be filled by active TNI soldiers, which were previously limited to 10 ministries and institutions as regulated under the current TNI Law. This phrase allows for a looser and more open interpretation allowing for the placement of active soldiers in various ministries or other institutions outside those that have previously been regulated. This risks eroding the principle of civilian supremacy in government and could lead to the military's dominance of the civil bureaucracy.
The placement of the TNI outside of its function as a tool of defence is not only wrong, but will also weaken the professionalism of the TNI itself. The professionalism of the TNI can be realised by the placement of the TNI as a tool of national defence, not in civilian positions that are very far from its competence. Placing the TNI in civilian positions is far from its duties and functions as a tool of defence and is tantamount to reviving the TNI's dwi-fungsi that was abolished some time ago.
The placement of the TNI outside of its function will also have an impact on confusing the authority and jurisdiction of TNI soldiers involved in criminal acts including human rights violations – whether they are tried in general courts or in military courts. Bearing in mind that up until now the government and the DPR have been reluctant to revise Law Number 31/1997 on Military Courts.
Based on this law, TNI soldiers who commit criminal acts, both military and general, are tried in military courts. This provision raises problems when active TNI soldiers occupy civil positions, because if they are involved in criminal acts in their capacity as civilian officials, they are still tried in military courts, not in a general court as applies to other civilian officials.
This will of course hamper the law enforcement process because military justice has different characteristics from general courts, especially in aspects of independence, transparency and accountability for the public and the media to oversee the course of trials.
The proposed changes to Article 47 will further damage the pattern of organisation and the career paths of state civil servants (ASN) because it gives more space for the TNI to enter all available civilian positions. Previously, Indonesian Human Rights Watch (Impartial) noted that there were already 2,569 active TNI soldiers in civilian positions in 2023. A total of 29 active officers occupy civilian positions outside the institutions proscribed by the TNI Law. The placement of active TNI soldiers civil positions ignores the specialisation, competence, experience, and period of service of ASN in related agencies. This disrupts the pattern of recruitment and fostering ASN carriers which should be regulated in a steady and gradual manner.
Second, the proposal for the removal of the prohibition on TNI members conducting business. This proposal is a wrong view and reflects the decline of reform efforts within the TNI. Military soldiers are prepared to be fully professionals in their field, namely defence, not doing business. The military is not built for business and political activities because it will interfere with its professionalism and reduce soldiers' sense of pride and will have an impact on the disorientation of their duties in maintaining the country's sovereignty.
At this point, the government should not abandon its responsibility for the welfare of soldiers by removing the prohibition on business for TNI soldiers. It is important to remember that the task of providing welfare for soldiers is the duty of the state and not the responsibility of soldiers individually. Instead of removing the prohibition on doing business for active TNI soldiers, the government and the TNI should focus on the welfare of ordinary soldiers instead of encouraging them to conduct business.
Third, the other concern that has emerged is over the proposed changes to Article 65 Paragraph 2 of the TNI Law which states that soldiers are subject to the authority of military courts in terms of violating military criminal law and general criminal law, which is contrary to the spirit and agenda of the reform of the TNI as part of reformasi – the political reform movement that began in 1998.
It is important to note that the reform of the military justice system is one of the TNI reform agenda items that is mandated under Article 3 Paragraph (4) of People's Consultative Assembly Decree (MPR TAP) Number VII/2000 and Article 65 Paragraph (2) of Law Number 34/2004 on the TNI. These two pieces of legislation provide the legal basis for mandating that TNI soldiers are subject to the authority of military courts in terms of violations of military criminal law and are subject to the authority of general courts in terms of violations of general criminal law.
The implementation of this agenda is important, not only as a form of implementing the principle of equality before the law as one of the important principles of a constitutional state, but also to ensure transparency and accountability, including preventing impunity for military members who commit general criminal acts.
The coalition is also of the view that efforts to expand the role of security actors through revision to the National Police Law (UU Polri) must also be stopped. Instead of expanding the role of the TNI-Polri, the government and the DPR should focus on strengthening supervisory institutions such as the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the National Police Commission (Kompolnas), the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) and so on, and not instead weaken these supervisory agencies by making significant cuts to their budgets.
Based on the above views, we urge the government and the DPR not to continue the deliberations on revisions to the TNI Law. As a representative institution, the DPR should be responsive to criticisms and opposition that develops in society. It would be better for the DPR and the government to focus on encouraging the delayed TNI reform agenda, such as formulating a law on military assistance task, reforming the military justice system and restructuring of the TNI's territorial commands (Koter), as well as conducting a comprehensive evaluation and correction of the deviations from the main tasks of the TNI.
We also hope that the DPR will not be subject to executive pressure, rejects all interventions and prioritise the principles of human rights.
Jakarta
March 6, 2025
Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform
Indonesian Human Rights Watch (Imparsial), the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI), Amnesty International Indonesia (AII), the Institute for Public Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), Human Right Working Group (HRWG), the Indonesian Form for the Environment (Walhi), the Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy, Centra Initiative, the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation (LBH), the Legal Aid Institute for the Press (LBH Pers), the Community Legal Aid Institute (LBH Masyarakat), the Malang Post Surabaya LBH, the Democratic Alliance for Papua (ALDP), Public Virtue, the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), the Jakarta Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), the Nusantara Indigenous Community Defence Association (PPMAN), the All Indonesia Student Executive Council (BEM SI) and Dejure.
[Translated by James Balowski. The original title of the article was "Hentikan Pembahasan Revisi Undang-Undang TNI yang Menghidupkan Dwifungsi".]
